extradition,” or whether the right to object is held solely by the
extraditing nation. Cuevas, 496 F.3d at 262. Rather, we have rejected
those challenges on the merits without deciding the standing issue.
See, e.g., United States v. Fusco, 560 Fed. App’x 43, 45 n.1 (2d Cir.
2014), cert denied. 135 S. Ct. 730 (2014) (“We need not resolve whether
Fusco has prudential standing to challenge his prosecution and
sentencing on the grounds that they violate the terms of the
Extradition Treaty or the rule of specialty, because his argument
plainly fails on the merits.”); United States v. Frankel, 443 Fed. App’x.
603, 606 (2d Cir. 2011) (“We do not decide whether Frankel has
standing to assert the rule of specialty as a basis to challenge his
sentence because his argument fails on the merits.”); United States v.
Banks, 464 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2006) (declining to “resolve”
whether “the right to enforce [an extradition] agreement belongs to
the Dominican Republic” and not to the defendant “because we find
no error in the district court’s findings or proceedings”).
“The doctrine of standing asks whether a litigant is entitled to
have a federal court resolve his grievance. This inquiry involves
‘both constitutional limitations on federal‐court jurisdiction and
prudential limits on its exercise.’” Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125,
128 (2004) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). Unlike
constitutional standing, which focuses on whether a litigant
sustained a cognizable injury‐in‐fact, “[t]he ‘prudential standing rule
. . . bars litigants from asserting the rights or legal interests of others
in order to obtain relief from injury to themselves.’” Rajamin v.
Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 757 F.3d 79, 86 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting
Warth, 422 U.S. at 509). “When both limitations [potentially] present
themselves, we may assume Article III standing and address ‘the
alternative threshold question’ of whether a party has prudential
standing.” Hillside Metro Assoc., LLC v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, Nat.