deprived him of the right to cross-examine his accusers. This argument fails, however, because as
this Court has previously noted, the “Confrontation Clause permits the admission of testimonial
hearsay evidence at sentencing proceedings,” and therefore, “testimonial hearsay does not affect a
defendant’s right to confrontation at sentencing.” United States v. Paull, 551 F.3d 516, 527 (6th Cir.
2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654 (6th Cir.
2005) (noting that “the confrontation clause does not apply in sentencing proceedings”). Pursuant
to the guidelines, a sentencing court “may consider relevant information without regard to its
admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the information has
sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.” USSG § 6A1.3(a); see United
States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1511 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (“So long as the evidence in the
presentence report bears ‘some minimal indicia of reliability in respect of defendant's right to due
process,’ the district court, after adoption of the guidelines, may still continue to consider and rely
on hearsay evidence without any confrontation requirement.” (quoting United States v. Robinson,
898 F.2d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1991))).
The district court concluded that Special Agent Sullivan’s testimony was credible and “had
. . . sufficient indicia of reliability for [the] court to consider [it] and to support [its] probable
accuracy.” (Sentencing Tr. 53.) Moreover, the district court also relied on Defendant’s own
statements admitting that he had sexual contact with his stepdaughter. Clearly, Defendant’s own
Defendant did not object to the paragraphs in the PSR detailing his sexual encounters with
his stepdaughter. Thus, Defendant is bound by these facts. See United States v. Moore, 582 F.3d
641, 644 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that the defendant was “bound by the factual allegations in the PSR
to which he did not object”).