appeal of this kind might be expected to involve. Because the analysis in the brief
appears to be thorough, we limit our review to the subjects the lawyer discusses, plus
the additional issues that Roach presents in opposition. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d
774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).
Counsel first considers whether Roach could challenge the adequacy of the plea
colloquy or the voluntariness of his guilty pleas. But counsel neglects to say whether
Roach wants his guilty pleas set aside. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th
Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002). And Roach himself
is silent about this question in his Rule 51(b) response. Regardless, our own review of the
record persuades us that a challenge would be frivolous. See United States v. Davenport,
719 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 2013); Konczak, 683 F.3d at 349. During the plea colloquy the
district court substantially complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b),
which typically is enough to shield a guilty plea from challenge on direct appeal.
See United States v. Zitt, 714 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Blalock, 321 F.3d
686, 688–89 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Akinsola, 105 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1997). The
court advised Roach of his constitutional rights, the charges against him, and the
minimum and maximum penalties; explained the appeal waiver in Roach’s plea
agreement; and found that his pleas were made voluntarily and supported by a
satisfactory factual basis. See F
Roach’s appellate lawyer also has evaluated the case for possible sentencing
claims, but concludes that any claim would be foreclosed by Roach’s appeal waiver. We
agree. Although Roach identifies several disagreements with the district court’s
calculation of his guidelines imprisonment range, his broad appeal waiver prevents him
from raising any of these objections on appeal. Appeal waivers stand or fall with the
guilty plea, see Zitt, 714 F.3d at 515; United States v. Sakellarion, 649 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir.
2011), and counsel has not identified any exception that would apply here, see United
States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d 176, 192–93 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Lucas, 670 F.3d 784,
795–96 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 2005).
Appeal waivers are permissible and enforceable, e.g., United States v. Hallahan,
756 F.3d 962, 971 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Suggs, 374 F.3d 508, 519–20 (7th Cir.
2004), and Roach’s belief that the Attorney General has directed federal prosecutors to
stop incorporating appeal waivers into plea agreements is mistaken. What the Attorney
General actually said is that federal prosecutors no longer should seek, as part of an
appeal waiver, a defendant’s promise to forego a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. See O
FFICE OF THE
EMORANDUM TO ALL FEDERAL