import cocaine, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, and attempt
to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 963 and
846. On appeal, Brown argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress physical evidence seized from his girlfriend’s car because the police
lacked probable cause to search the car. Brown further argues that the police
exceeded the scope of a valid inventory search when they read the contents of a
document found in the car, thus converting it into an investigatory search.
“A district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question
of law and fact. This Court reviews the district court’s finding of facts under the
clearly erroneous standard. The district court’s application of the law to those facts
is subject to de novo review.” United States v. Zapata, 180 F.3d 1237, 1240 (11th
Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). “Further, when considering a ruling on a motion to
suppress, all facts are construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party
below.” United States v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2000).
A party moving to suppress evidence must first show that he has standing,
consisting of “a legitimate expectation of privacy” in the car being searched.
United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 548 (11th Cir. 1987). On appeal, the
government does not dispute that Brown has standing to challenge the search of the
car at issue, even though his girlfriend owned it. Furthermore, the record reflects