review, just as it must be met by persons appearing in courts of first instance.”
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997); accord Thomas
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 631 F.3d 1153, 1159 (10th Cir. 2011); see Fla. Wildlife
Fed’n, Inc. v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 647 F.3d 1296, 1302 (11th Cir. 2011)
(“If at any point in the litigation the plaintiff ceases to meet all three requirements
for constitutional standing, the case no longer presents a live case or controversy,
and the federal court must dismiss the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.”). “To have standing, one must be aggrieved by the order from
which appeal is taken.” Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 9
F.3d 849, 854 (10th Cir. 1993); see Raley v. Hyundai Motor Co., 642 F.3d 1271,
1275 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[T]hese individuals possess Article III standing in the
sense that they have been injured by a district court ruling and a favorable
decision on appeal would ameliorate that injury.”). “Just like litigants generally
cannot bring suit to vindicate the rights of others, parties generally do not have
standing to appeal in order to protect the rights of third parties.” Thomas, 631
F.3d at 1159 (citation omitted).
The parties here did not address standing in their initial round of briefing.
However, standing is a question of “justiciability [that] implicates this court’s
jurisdiction”; consequently, where the record reveals a colorable standing issue,
we have a “duty to undertake an independent examination” (sua sponte if
necessary) of that issue. Morgan v. McCotter, 365 F.3d 882, 887 (10th Cir.