the analysis in the brief appears to be thorough, we limit our review to the subjects that
counsel has discussed. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United
States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).
Counsel first informs us that Escobedo wishes to withdraw his admissions and so
properly addresses whether he made those admissions knowingly and voluntarily.
See United States v. Wheaton, 610 F.3d 389, 390 (7th Cir. 2010). We agree with counsel that
challenging the voluntariness of the admissions would be frivolous. The district court,
during a lengthy colloquy with Escobedo, informed him of the consequences of forgoing
a hearing and the maximum possible penalty it could impose, and also ensured that no
one had improperly induced the admissions. See F
P. 32.1(b)(2); United States
v. LeBlanc, 175 F.3d 511, 517 (7th Cir. 1999). Further counsel now confirms that neither he
nor Escobedo seeks to challenge the district court’s prior finding that Escobedo was
competent to proceed in this case.
Counsel next proposes a challenge to the revocation of Escobedo’s supervised
release, but properly concludes that this challenge would be frivolous. Because Escobedo
admitted at the revocation hearing that the government could prove he unlawfully
possessed a controlled substance, revocation was mandatory. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(1);
United States v. Jones, 774 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2014).
Counsel also considers whether Escobedo could challenge the district court’s
determination that, while on supervised release, he violated the Illinois law against
unlawful restraint, see 720 ILCS 5/10‐3. We agree with counsel that it would be frivolous
to challenge this determination. The court found that the testimony of the government’s
witnesses—two police officers and a probation officer—was credible, and we will
generally not disturb credibility findings on review. United States v. Longstreet, 669 F.3d
834, 837 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Clark, 538 F.3d 803, 813 (7th Cir. 2008). Even
though Escobedo’s counsel implied that he may have pinned the woman down in
self‐defense, the court could reasonably credit the officers’ testimony that he was
unlawfully restraining her against her will, especially in light of a recorded jailhouse
telephone conversation in which the victim told Escobedo that he had held her down
and choked her.
Counsel also considers whether Escobedo could challenge the district judge’s
impartiality based on his questioning at the hearing of one of the officer witnesses. We
agree with counsel that this challenge would be frivolous. The questions by the judge in
this case were designed to clarify an issue—the officer’s interpretation of the victim’s