because there is no similarity requirement and Olfano’s previous
incidents of sexual misconduct are not so different in kind, they
can be used to enhance his sentence for receiving child
pornography via the Internet. Accordingly, we see no problem
with the District Court’s five-level enhancement under section
2G2.2(b)(4) of the Guidelines.
B. Reasonableness of sentence
Olfano’s second argument is that the District Court
imposed an unreasonable sentence by again treating the
Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory.
This Court reviews “deferentially a district court’s
application of the § 3553(a) factors to the facts of a case, and
must ensure only that ‘the district judge imposed the sentence
that he or she did for reasons that are logical and consistent with
the factors set forth in section 3553(a).’” United States v.
Severino, 454 F.3d 206, 210 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting United
States v. Williams, 425 F.3d 478, 481 (7th Cir. 2005)).
Ultimately, the court reviews a sentence for unreasonableness.
Booker, 543 U.S. at 264.
The Sentencing Reform Act orders district courts to
“consider” the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United
States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc). The
party appealing the sentence carries the burden of demonstrating
unreasonableness. United States v. King, 454 F.3d 187, 194 (3d
In its most recent sentencing decision, Rita v. United
States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007), the Supreme Court granted wide
deference to a district judge in sentencing. Rita, like Olfano,
was sentenced to the minimum term of imprisonment within his
sentencing range, but challenged the sentence as unreasonable.
Id. at 2462. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence and stated
that “we cannot read the statute (or our precedent) as insisting
upon a full opinion in every case. The appropriateness of brevity
or length, conciseness or detail, when to write, what to say
depends upon circumstances.” Id. at 2468.