required reasonable suspicion “is based upon the totality of the circumstances, taking into
account an officer’s reasonable inferences based on training, experience, and common
sense.” Id. at 1083 (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)). Inchoate
suspicions and unparticularized hunches do not provide reasonable suspicion. United
States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 878 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Sokolow,
490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989), Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). When reviewing a district
court’s decision on a motion to suppress, we “accept the district court’s factual findings
unless they are clearly erroneous.” Rice, 483 F.3d at 1082 (quoting Alcaraz-Arellano,
441 F.3d at 1258). We review de novo the reasonableness of a search or seizure under
the Fourth Amendment. United States v. DeJear, 552 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2009)
(citing United States v. Lyons, 510 F.3d 1225, 1234 (10th Cir. 2007)).
As the district court held, the initial stop of Montes’ vehicle was justified at its
inception because Deputy Guevara stopped Montes for turning left on a red light. Order
Den. Def.’s Mot. to Suppress 2-3, March 16, 2009, ECF. No. 64 (“Order”). The district
court further held that Montes’ prolonged detention was justified by Deputy Guevara’s
reasonable concern for officer safety based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 4.
Montes does not challenge the constitutionality of the initial traffic stop, the nature or
extent of the prolonged detention, or the underlying factual findings by the district court.
Rather, Montes argues that the two grounds giving rise to the officers’ safety concerns,
nervousness and a “shoulder dip,” without more, are insufficient to provide a reasonably
articulable suspicion of criminal activity as a matter of law.
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