months based on a total offense level of 30 and criminal-history category of II. The court
sentenced Gonzales-Chavez to 132 months.
Gonzales-Chavez filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed attorney has
concluded that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw under Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Gonzales-Chavez opposes counsel’s motion. See C
51(b). Counsel has submitted a brief that explains the nature of the case and addresses
the issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve. Because the analysis
in counsel’s brief appears to be thorough, we limit our review to the subjects that
counsel has discussed, plus the additional issues that Gonzales-Chavez, disagreeing
with counsel, believes have merit. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir.
2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).
Counsel tells us that Gonzales-Chavez does not wish to challenge his guilty plea,
and thus counsel appropriately forgoes discussing the voluntariness of the plea or the
adequacy of the plea colloquy. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir.
2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002). Counsel also advises
that he reviewed the district court’s application of the sentencing guidelines but did not
identify even a potential claim of error. So the only conceivable appellate claim, says
counsel, is whether Gonzales-Chavez could challenge the reasonableness of his
132-month prison term.
That within-guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable. See Rita v. United
States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007); United States v. Smith, 721 F.3d 904, 906 (7th Cir. 2013).
Counsel considers, but correctly rejects as frivolous, a possible argument that the
presumption falls away because Gonzales-Chavez’s codefendant also pleaded guilty to
the conspiracy charge but was sentenced only to 120 months. Codefendants commonly
receive different sentences even when they are convicted of the same crime. See United
States v. Gammicchia, 498 F.3d 467, 469 (7th Cir. 2007). The statutory minimum for both
defendants was 120 months, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), but, unlike Gonzales-Chavez,
his codefendant had no criminal history. In sentencing Gonzales-Chavez, a Mexican
citizen who was in the United States illegally after previously being removed, the
district court properly took into account his criminal history—a prior felony drug
conviction—as well as his continuing disregard for immigration laws. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(1), (2).
In his Rule 51(b) response, Gonzales-Chavez proposes arguing that the
government “did not offer evidence to justify the mandatory 10 year charge.” True,