Case: 12-16474 Date Filed: 09/10/2013 Page: 7 of 10
violation of Fla. Stat. § 316.1935(2) is a violent felony under the ACCA applies
here because we held that any type of vehicle flight inherently poses the same sort
of risks as the enumerated crimes. Petite, 703 F.3d at 1301; see Gilbert, 640 F.3d
at 1309 n.16. Ortiz has advanced no reason why a conviction under § 316.1935(1)
does not pose these same inherent risks. Indeed, Sykes explains that a defendant
who defies a police officer by fleeing in a car commits a violent felony, even if the
defendant is not going at full speed, because he “creates the possibility that police
will, in a legitimate and lawful manner,” match the defendant’s speed or use force
to retrieve him. Sykes, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2273. A violation of Fla.
Stat. § 316.1935(1), which prohibits willfully refusing or failing to stop a vehicle
or, after stopping, fleeing and eluding an officer, creates the same possibilities and
poses the same inherent dangers. See Fla. Stat. § 316.1935(1).
Ortiz urges us to consider the different punitive schemes established in Fla.
Stat. § 316.1935 as evidence that a conviction under § 316.1935(1), which could
carry a less severe penalty than convictions under other subsections, is not
categorically a crime of violence. However, we have already determined that the
tiered punitive schemes provided for in Fla. Stat. § 316.1935 are not relevant in
determining whether a vehicular fleeing and eluding conviction is a violent felony
under the ACCA. See Petite, 703 F.3d at 1300-01; see also Sykes, ___ U.S. at ___,
131 S.Ct. at 2273. What is relevant is whether the offense at issue “nonetheless