United States v. Davis
president. United States v. Davis, 397 F.3d 340, 342 (6th Cir. 2005). Davis agreed to be a personal
guarantor for the line of credit. Id. When the bank renewed the line of credit in 1991, Davis
submitted a financial statement that omitted a $100,000 debt he had incurred during the previous
Fries Correctional defaulted on the loan in 1992, and the bank, invoking the personal
, filed a civil action against Davis. In April 1992, during a deposition in the civil action,
Davis claimed that he no longer owned several securities listed in a July 1991 financial statement.
Other financial documents, however, showed this statement to be false, revealing that he had
continued to own the securities until October 1992, when he sold them.
In 1992, Davis and his wife declared bankruptcy. And in August 1993, the federal
government notified Davis that it intended to “initiate criminal proceedings against him” as a result
of the defaulted loan. Id. at 342. When the Davis bankruptcy ended in 1996, the bank had yet to
recover roughly $600,000 in loan proceeds.
On December 15, 1999, the government indicted Davis. And on May 23, 2002, a jury
convicted him of two counts of bank fraud—one relating to the omission of the $100,000 loan from
his 1991 financial statement, the other relating to the false statements he made during his April 1992
In August 2003, the district court sentenced Davis. Applying the then-mandatory guidelines,
it used a base-offense level of 6 and added 14 levels due to the amount of the loss. The court
rejected Davis’s requests for a downward departure based on:
(1) acceptance of responsibility, see JA 381 (noting that Davis had “contested the
facts and . . . the implications to be drawn from them”);
(2) post-conduct rehabilitation, see JA 384–85 (“There, quite frankly, is no evidence
that this defendant now is an improved human being over what he was before this
offense . . . .”); JA 387 (citing Davis’s testimony at sentencing as an additional
justification for denying the departure and noting that the testimony “was not as
candid as perhaps it could be”);
(3) the government’s delay in bringing the indictment, see JA 392 (“It would be
difficult to say that a prosecution brought within the applicable statute of limitations
is something outside the heartland of cases and beyond the thinking of the framers
of the guidelines.”); and
(4) the claim that the guideline range did not accurately reflect the seriousness of the
offense, see JA 384 (noting that the sentencing range did not overstate the
seriousness of the offense).
All of this left Davis with a guidelines range of 33 to 41 months. “Normally,” the court
noted, it “would be inclined to sentence in the middle or upper reaches of the guideline range,” but
it decided to impose a 33-month sentence on each of the two counts (to run concurrently) and 5
years of supervised release. JA 394–95. In choosing the low end of the guidelines range, the court
relied on Davis’s age at the time (68) and the delay between the bank fraud and sentencing (12
years). The court did not impose restitution because Davis could not afford it.
On appeal, this court affirmed Davis’s conviction but remanded the case for resentencing.
As to the sentencing aspect of its decision, the court reasoned that the district court had calculated
the sentence under the 2002 Guidelines Manual instead of the more-lenient version in effect when
Davis committed the offense (the 1991 version), and that the court’s imposition of a sentence under