Creditor’s Rights and Remedies § 635 (2007). As such, even if the transfer to
Compean is set aside under TUFTA, the Corpuses would not obtain a legal right
or interest in the Cottonwood property.
B. Interest Under the Bankruptcy Code
The Corpuses next assert an interest in the Cottonwood property superior
to that of Compean, and thus the government, under the Bankruptcy Code. The
Corpuses contend that the sale of the Cottonwood property to Compean is void
under the Bankruptcy Code because they were creditors of the Arriagas, the
Cottonwood property was part of the Arriagas’ bankruptcy estate at the time of
its transfer to Compean, and the Arriagas gave them no notice of the sale as
required by 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1).
The district court concluded that the
Arriagas “arguably were not obliged to tell the [Corpuses] that they planned to
sell the Cottonwood property” under the particular terms of the Arriagas’
Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan, and further determined that even if notice was
required, the Corpuses’ right to assert an interest under the Bankruptcy Code
was time-barred under the two-year statute of limitations provided in 11 U.S.C.
Although the Corpuses re-urge on appeal that the sale to Compean is void
because the Arriagas failed to give them notice of the sale, the Corpuses do not
explain how the district court erred by barring their claim under § 549(d).
Assuming arguendo that the Arriagas were required by § 363(b) to provide the
Corpuses with notice of the sale,
we agree with the district court that the
Title 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) provides: “The trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use,
sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate . . . .” 11
U.S.C. § 363(b)(1).
The district court’s conclusion that notice was not required rested on facts concerning
the bankruptcy proceeding, including how the Cottonwood property was scheduled, the
participation of the Corpuses in the proceeding, and the bankruptcy court’s confirmation order.