which turned out to be erroneous. Id.; see also Arizona v.
Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14 (1995) (holding that good faith
exception was met where police reasonably relied on
erroneous information concerning an arrest warrant in a
database maintained by judicial employees); Illinois v. Krull,
480 U.S. 340, 358–60 (1987) (extending good faith exception
to searches conducted in reasonable reliance on subsequently
invalidated statutes); Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 (holding that the
officer’s reasonable reliance on a warrant later held to be
invalid met the good faith exception).
The Supreme Court has never applied the good faith
exception to excuse an officer who was negligent himself,
and whose negligence directly led to the violation of the
defendant’s constitutional rights.
Here, the government fails
to assert that Agent Walla relied on anyone or anything in
conducting his search of Camou’s cell phone, let alone that
any reliance was reasonable. The government instead only
asserts that by searching the phone, Agent Walla was not
acting “recklessly[,] or deliberately” misbehaving. In this
case, the good faith exception cannot apply.
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district
court’s denial of Camou’s motion to suppress.
In fact, because “objectively reasonable” and “negligent” are mutually
, the only way to reconcile the “objectively reasonable reliance”
rule established in Leon
is to conclude that the officer who
executed the unconstitutional search or seizure cannot have been the
negligent actor. Herring
should be read as holding instead that when an
officer reasonably relies on incorrect information that was the result ofanother
individual’s “isolated” and “attenuated” negligence, the good faith