reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Senathirajah v. INS,
157 F.3d 210, 216 (3d Cir.1998) (quotation omitted). Under this deferential standard,
“the BIA's finding must be upheld unless the evidence not only supports a contrary
conclusion, but compels it.” Abdille, 242 F.3d at 483-84 (citing INS v. Elias-Zacarias,
502 U.S. 478, 481 & n. 1 (1992)).
The IJ found that Sunarjo lacked credibility and that his testimony, even if true,
failed to establish eligibility for relief. However, the BIA’s decision was not based on
the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. Thus, we must assume the truth of Sunarjo’s
factual contentions. See Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 652 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000).
Nonetheless, even assuming the truth of those factual contentions, we find that substantial
evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Sunarjo failed to meet his burden of
establishing eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal.
In his application for asylum and withholding of removal, Sunarjo asserted that he
was an ethnic Chinese Christian Indonesian and asserted that he would be “hurt or killed”
if returned to Indonesia. He based that conclusion upon three incidents in which he
claims he was persecuted on account of his religion or ethnicity. First, he asserted that he
was treated rudely by parking attendants at some unspecified time. Second, he said that
The IJ also found that Sunarjo filed a frivolous asylum application. The BIA
disagreed and declined to affirm the IJ’s holding on that point.