OCTOBER TERM, 2008
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
JIMENEZ v. QUARTERMAN, DIRECTOR, TEXAS
DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORREC-
TIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 07–6984. Argued November 4, 2008—Decided January 13, 2009
After petitioner’s state conviction for burglary became final on October
11, 1996, the state appellate court held in state habeas proceedings
that petitioner had been denied his right to appeal and granted him
the right to file an out-of-time appeal. He filed the appeal, his convic-
tion was affirmed, and his time for seeking certiorari in this Court
expired on January 6, 2004. Petitioner filed a second state habeas
application on December 6, 2004, which was denied 355 days later,
on June 29, 2005. He then filed a federal habeas petition on July 19,
2005, relying on 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(1)(A) to establish its timeliness.
Section 2244(d)(1)(A) provides that the one-year limitations period for
seeking review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
begins on “the date on which the judgment be-
came final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the
time for seeking such review.” Petitioner argued that his judgment
became final on January 6, 2004, when time expired for seeking cer-
tiorari review of the decision in his out-of-time appeal, and that his
July 19, 2005, petition was timely because the calculation of
AEDPA’s 1-year limitation period excludes the 355 days “during
which [his] properly filed application for State post-conviction . . . re-
view . . . [was] pending,” §2244(d)(2). The District Court disagreed,
ruling that the proper start date for calculating AEDPA’s 1-year limi-
tations period under §2244(d)(1)(A) was October 11, 1996, when peti-
tioner’s conviction first became final. The District Court dismissed
the federal habeas petition as time barred. The Fifth Circuit denied
petitioner’s request for a certificate of appealability.