1. Section 2244(d), the AEDPA statute of limitations, is subject to
equitable tolling in appropriate cases. Pp. 12–21.
support the Court’s holding. First, be-
cause AEDPA’s “statute of limitations defense . . . is not ‘jurisdic-
tional,’ ” Day v. McDonough, 547 U. S. 198, 205, 213, it is subject to a
“rebuttable presumption” in favor “of equitable tolling,” Irwin v. De-
partment of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95–96. That presump-
tion’s strength is reinforced here by the fact that “equitable princi-
ples” have traditionally “governed” substantive habeas law. Munaf v.
Geren, 553 U. S. 674, ___, and the fact that Congress enacted AEDPA
after Irwin and therefore was likely aware that courts, when inter-
preting AEDPA’s timing provisions, would apply the presumption,
see, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U. S. ___, ___. Second,
§2244(d) differs significantly from the statutes at issue in United
States v. Brockamp, 519 U. S. 347, 350–352, and United States v.
Beggerly, 524 U. S. 38, 49, in which the Court held that Irwin’s pre-
sumption had been overcome. For example, unlike the subject mat-
ters at issue in those cases—tax collection and land claims—
AEDPA’s subject matter, habeas corpus, pertains to an area of the
law where equity finds a comfortable home. See Munaf, supra, at
___. Brockamp, supra, at 352, distinguished. Moreover, AEDPA’s
limitations period is neither unusually generous nor unusually com-
plex. Finally, the Court disagrees with respondent’s argument that
equitable tolling undermines AEDPA’s basic purpose of eliminating
delays in the federal habeas review process, see, e.g., Day, supra, at
205–206. AEDPA seeks to do so without undermining basic habeas
corpus principles and by harmonizing the statute with prior law, un-
der which a petition’s timeliness was always determined under equi-
table principles. See, e.g., Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U. S. 473, 483.
Such harmonization, along with the Great Writ’s importance as the
only writ explicitly protected by the Constitution, counsels hesitancy
before interpreting AEDPA’s silence on equitable tolling as congres-
sional intent to close courthouse doors that a strong equitable claim
would keep open. Pp. 12–16.
The Eleventh Circuit’s per se standard is too rigid. A “peti-
tioner” is “entitled to equitable tolling” if he shows “(1) that he has
been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary
circumstance stood in his way” and prevented timely filing. Pace v.
DiGuglielmo, 544 U. S. 408, 418. Such “extraordinary circumstances”
are not limited to those that satisfy the Eleventh Circuit’s test.
Courts must often “exercise [their] equity powers . . . on a case-by-
case basis,” Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360, 375, demonstrating
“flexibility” and avoiding “mechanical rules,” Holmberg v. Armbrecht,