However, the DFEH issued its right-to-sue letter on June 18, 2008. Once the
DFEH letter issued, an EEOC charge was deemed filed; Rucker was entitled to a
right-to-sue letter from the EEOC 180 days thereafter, or on December 15, 2008.
See Stiefel v. Bechtel Corp., 624 F.3d 1240, 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 2010). His civil
complaint was not filed until June 17, 2009. The commencement of the civil
action was thus outside the limitations period set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(f)(1). See Stiefel, 624 F.3d at 1245. Nor has Rucker presented any facts that
would warrant equitable tolling of the limitations period. See Scholar v. Pac. Bell,
963 F.2d 264, 267–68 (9th Cir. 1992). The district court did not err in dismissing
the disability discrimination claims.
Rucker also contends that the district court erred in denying his request for
an evidentiary hearing. The decision whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. McLachlan v. Bell, 261 F.3d 908, 910 (9th Cir.
2001). The magistrate judge’s Findings and Recommendations concluded that
even if Rucker’s allegations were taken as true, the limitations period would not be
equitably tolled, and no evidentiary hearing was needed. Because we agree that
even under the facts Rucker alleges, his claims are time-barred, there was no abuse
of discretion in the magistrate judge’s conclusion. See id. at 910–11.
To the extent Rucker contends that his suit is based on the right-to-sue
letter issued on May 25, 2007, his suit is even more untimely, and he has again not
shown entitlement to equitable tolling.