erroneously concluded that Nguyen’s Title VII claim was time-barred nonetheless.
The district court confirmed that Nguyen’s October 24, 2008 discrimination charge
with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”) “was based on
grounds of race, color, national origin and sex.” The district court also explained
that because of worksharing between the DFEH and the EEOC, Nguyen timely
filed her EEOC charge, and that she was entitled to file suit in federal district court:
Plaintiff’s DFEH charge satisfied the requirement to file a charge with the
EEOC. The DFEH has a worksharing agreement with the EEOC, wherein
the DFEH is the agent of the EEOC for the ‘purpose of receiving . . .
charges.’ Steifel, 624 F.3d at 1244; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(b). Plaintiff became
‘entitled’ to an EEOC right-to-sue letter 180 days later, on May 6, 2008.
Thereafter, Plaintiff had 90 days, until August 4, 2009, to file suit.
Nguyen was supposed to receive a right-to-sue letter on May 6, 2008, after
which she would have had 90 days to file suit in federal court. The letter did not
arrive until August 14, 2008; thus, she was unable to file within the 90-day period.
We find that in this matter, “the 90-day filing period is a statute of limitations
subject to equitable tolling . . . .” Stiefel v. Bechtel Corp., 624 F.3d 1240, 1245
(9th Cir. 2010) (alteration, citation and quotation omitted).
In Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc., 801 F.2d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 1986), this court
equitably tolled the statute of limitations where Valenzuela mistakenly filed in
state court and was awaiting the outcome of the state court proceeding when the
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